Abstract. A new precomputation method is presented for computing g R for a xed element g and a randomly chosen exponent R in a given group. Our method is more e cient and exible than the previously proposed methods, especially in the case where the amount of storage available is very small or quite large. It is also very e cient in computing g R y E for a small size E and variable number y, which occurs in the veri cation of Schnorr's identi cation scheme or its variants. Finally it is shown that our method is well-suited for parallel processing as well.
Introduction
The problem of exponentiating fast in a given group (usually Z N , N a large prime or a product of two large primes) is very important for e cient implementations of most public key cryptosystems (hereafter it is assumed w.l.o.g. that the computation is performed over Z N and thus multiplication denotes multiplication mod N). A typical method for exponentiation is to use the binary algorithm, known as the square-andmultiply method 1]. For 512 bit modulus and exponent, this method requires 766 multiplications on average and 1022 in the worst case. The signed binary algorithm [2] [3] can reduce the required number of multiplications to around 682 on average and 768 in the worst case.
On the other hand, using a moderate amount of storage for intermediate values, the performance can be considerably improved again. Knuth's 5-window algorithm 1, 4] can do exponentiation in about 609 multiplications on average, including the on-line precomputation of 16 multiplications. The fastest known algorithm for exponentiation is the windowing method based on addition chains, where we can use bigger windows such as 10 4] and need more storage for intermediate values 5] . Though nding the shortest addition chain is an NP-complete problem 6], it is reported 4] that, by applying heuristics, an addition chain of length around 605 can be computed.
These general methods can be used for any cryptosystems requiring exponentiation such as RSA 7] and ElGamal 8] . However, in many cryptographic protocols based on the discrete logarithm problem, we need to compute g R for a xed base g but for a randomly chosen exponent R. Thanks to the xed base element, a precomputation table can be used to reduce the number of multiplications required, of course at the expense of storage for precomputed values.
At Eurocrypt'92, Brickell et al. 9] proposed such a method for speeding up the computation of g R (called the BGMW method, for the convenience of reference). 
: Using a basic digit set for base b, they extended the basic scheme so that the computation time can be further decreased while the storage required is increased accordingly.
In this paper, we propose another precomputation method for fast exponentiation. Our method is a generalization of the simple observation that if an n-bit exponent R is divided into two equal blocks (i.e., R = R 1 2 n=2 +R 0 ) and g 1 = g 2 n=2 is precomputed, then g R can be evaluated in a half of the time required by the binary method in the worst case ( 7 12 on average) by computing g R1 1 g R0 . It will be seen that the proposed method is more e cient, especially when the storage available is very small or quite large, and also more exible, giving a wide range of time-memory tradeo s, than the BGMW method. The case of using a small amount of storage is of great importance for an application to smart cards having limited storage and computing power, but the BGMW method is not so e cient for this case.
Another advantage of the proposed method is its e ciency in computing g R y E , where y is not xed and the size of E is much less than that of R, which is needed for the veri cation of Schnorr's identi cation and signature scheme 10] or its variants, e.g., Brickell-McCurley's scheme 11] and Okamoto's scheme 12]. Note that, for this kind of computation, representing exponents in non-binary power base may considerably increase the on-line computational load (see section 4). Finally we show that the proposed method is also well-suited for parallel processing.
Throughout this paper, we will use g as a xed element of Z N and R as an n-bit random exponent over 0; 2 n ). We denote by jSj the bit-length of S for an integer S or the cardinality of S for a set S. We also denote by dxe the smallest integer not less than x and by bxc the greatest integer not greater than x.
Review of Previous Work : BGMW Method
In this section, we brie y review the BGMW method, the precomputation method proposed by Brickell 
Therefore, if we precompute and store powers g mb i for all i < t and m 2 M, then g R can be computed in at most t + h ? 2 
The Proposed Method
We now present our method for fast evaluation of g R using a precomputation table.
Let R be an n-bit exponent for which we want to compute g R . We rst divide the 
If we let R i = e i;a?1 e i;1 e i;0 be the binary representation of R i (0 i < h), then R i;j (0 j < v) is represented in binary as R i;j = e i;jb+b?1 e i;jb+k e i;jb+1 e i;jb : Therefore the expression (5) can be rewritten as follows :
Next suppose that the following values are precomputed and stored for all 1 i < 2 h and 0 j < v. G
Here the index i is equal to the decimal value of e h?1 e 1 e 0 . Then, using the precomputed values of (7), we can rewrite the expression (6) as
where I j;k = e h?1;bj+k e 1;bj+k e 0;bj+k (0 j < b), which corresponds to the k-th bit column of the j-th block column in the gure 1. Now it is straightforward to compute g R using the expression (8) We next count the number of multiplications required by the above algorithm.
Here we have to note that the (v ? 1)-th blocks in the gure 1 may not be full of b bits. In fact, they are of bv ? a bit size. Thus the number of terms to be multiplied together in the inner for-loop is v for the rst bv?a rounds and v+1 for the remaining b ? bv + a rounds. Therefore, the total number of multiplications required is at most v(bv-a)+(v+1)(b-bv+a)-2 = a+b-2 in the worst case. Since we may assume that the probability of I j;k being zero is In the above, we assumed that the exponent R is partitioned into hv blocks of almost equal size and that these hv blocks are arranged in a h v rectangular shape. In most cases, such partitions and arrangements yield better performance than others for a given amount of storage, but sometimes this may not be the case. For example, consider two con gurations shown in the gure 2 below, where a 512-bit exponent is partitioned and arranged in two di erent ways. The rst con guration corresponds to the case we analyzed in the above and results in the performance of 118.78 multiplications on average (122 in the worst case) with storage for 155 values. On the other hand, with the second con guration, we can do the exponentiation in 117.13 multiplications on average (119 in the worst case) using storage for 157 values. This shows that we had better choose the second con guration. The number of multiplications and storage requirements for a 512 bit modulus are summarized in tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix B, for a 160-bit and 512-bit exponent respectively. Note that not only is the proposed method simpler, but it also achieves better performance than the BGMW method. In particular, due to its e ectiveness over a wide range of storage, our method is exibly applicable to various computing environments according to the amount of storage available. For example, to speed up the computation by smart cards, we may choose the con guration of 4 2. Then for 512 bit modulus and exponent the computation of g R can be done in 182 multiplications on average with 1920 bytes of storage. On the other hand, when a relatively large amount of storage is available, we can choose, for example, the con guration of 7 4, achieving 90.42 multiplications on average with about 32 Kbytes of storage.
Speeding up Identi cation and Signature Veri cations
Based on the discrete logarithm problem, a lot of identi cation and digital signature schemes have been developed (e.g., [10] [11] [12] ). In all these schemes, along with a few modular multiplications the prover (or the signer) needs to compute g R for a random R, which can be e ciently performed by the method described in section 3. On the other hand, to validate the prover's identity or the signature, the veri er needs to perform the computation of the form g R y E where y corresponds to the public key of the prover (or the signer) and thus varies in each run of the protocol. The size of E typically lies between 20 and 40 in identi cation schemes and around 80 in the corresponding signature schemes. This section investigates the performance of the proposed method for computing g R y E .
Let t be the size of E. It is clear that if t b, then g R y E can be computed in a+b+t?2 multiplications in the worst case and of t > b, we can either proceed as above or do the computation after partitioning E into smaller blocks. The rst case yields the performance of a+2t?2 multiplications in the worst case and 2 h ?1 2 h a + 1:5t? 2 on average. However, if t is much larger than b, the performance can be further improved by dividing E into smaller blocks.
Thus, for more general formulae, suppose that E is partitioned into u blocks of almost equal size (Consider the whole con guration for computing g R y E as u 1jh v). Let c be the bit-length of the partitioned blocks (i.e., c = d t u e). Then With the proposed method, the Schnorr-like identi cation and/or signature schemes can be made more practical for smart card implementations. For example, with a 512-bit modulus, 160-bit exponents and t = 30, the veri cation condition can be checked in 80.5 multiplications on average, if 1920 bytes of storage are available (4 2 con guration). Similarly, a signature with t = 80 can be veri ed in 144.13 multiplications on average using the same amount of storage. This is a considerable speedup only with a very small amount of storage, compared with the binary method requiring 246.5 multiplications for t = 30 and 259.0 multiplications for t = 80 on average. Moreover, identi cation or signature veri cations are usually performed in much more powerful terminals capable of being equipped with a large amount of memory. In such an environment, we may adopt the 8 2 con guration and thus can perform, on average, identity veri cations in 60.2 multiplications for t = 30 and signature veri cations in 126.6 multiplications for t = 80, using about 32 Kbytes of storage.
Further improvement with additional communication: Smalladditional communication can considerably reduce the number of multiplications for computing g R y E again. That is, the veri er can save the on-line computational load for preparing y k = y 2 kc for k = 1; 2; ; u?1, if they are precomputed and stored by the signer (or the prover), since y is a xed number to him, and then transmitted together with other data. For example, for the signature scheme with t = 80, if the signer sends 2 additional 512 bit blocks y 1 ; y 2 where y 1 = y 2 27 and y 2 = y 2 27
1 , together with a signature for message, then the signature veri cation can be done in 90.13 multiplications on average with the 4 2 con guration. Therefore, 54 multiplications can be saved only with the increase of 128 bytes of communication. This corresponds to about a 3-fold speedup on average over the binary method which requires 259 multiplications on average.
For comparison, it is worth mentioning that the BGMW method is less e cient for the computation of the form g R y E in either case we considered above. In case of no additional communication,if the exponents are represented in nonbinary power base, more computations are needed in performing the on-line precomputation required for y E . When addtional communication is allowed, more precomputed values must be transmitted due to the use of small base.
The above method of combining precomputation and additional communication can be used to speed up the veri cation of the digital signature standard (DSS) 14] as well. In DSS, we have to perform the computation of the type g R y E with jRj = jEj = 160 and thus without additional communication we can gain no advantage with precomputation. However, if the signer sends 3 additional blocks fy 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 g where y i = y BrickellMcCurley 11] ), under the assumption that the signer sends additionally 3 precomputed values for his public key together with a signature, as mentioned above. Here we only take into account the number of multiplications for exponentiation operations, neglecting some other necessary operations such as reduction mod q and multiplicative inverse mod q where q is a prime of about 160 bit size. Two con gurations of 4 2 and 8 2 are taken as examples, since the former is suitable for smart card applications and the latter for more general applications with a relatively large amount of storage available. For comparison, the performance of the binary method is also presented.
Parallel Processing
With multiple processors, the proposed method can be parallelized, much more e ciently than the BGMW method, by assigning the j-th processor to the j-th 
where we assume that each processor stores in its local memory 2 h ?1 precomputed values. The computation of each processor can be completed in at most 2(b ? 1) multiplications. After then, we need dlog 2 ve multiplications in addition to produce the nal result. Therefore, the total number of multiplications is 2(b ? 1) + dlog 2 ve. Table B. 3 in the appendix B shows the required number of multiplications for 160/512 bit exponents, according to the number of processors and the storage needed per processor. Note that only with a small number of processors the performance can be greatly improved. For example, for 512-bit modulus and exponent, we can compute g R in 32 multiplications , when 4 processors are available and each processor has a local storage for 255 precomputed values (about 16 Kbytes). With more processors, say 16, the exponentiation can be done in 10 multiplications with the same storage requirement.
The described parallel computation can be more e ciently implemented by a special-purpose hardware. For example, with 8 pairs of multiply and squaring circuits together with read-only memory for 120 precomputed values (4 8 con guration), we can compute g R with jRj = 512 in 18 multiplications and 15 squarings. If we use storage for 2040 values (8 8 con guration) with the same circuits, then the computation can be done in 10 multiplications and 7 squarings.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new method for fast exponentiation with precomputation. The proposed method is very simple but achieves better performance than the BGMW method 9]. Our method is also preferable since it is exibly applicable to various computing environments due to its wide range of time-storage tradeo s. In particular, using the proposed method, we can substantially speed up the computation by smart cards with only a very small amount of storage. We also showed that the proposed method can also speed up the computation of the form g R y E with y variable. This can make much more practical the Schnorr-type identi cation and signature scheme, since the veri er as well as the prover (signer) can gain great computational advantage with a moderate amount of storage. Finally we presented how the proposed algorithm can be parallelized. Such parallel processing may be useful in high performance server machines with multiple processors.
